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Entangled Borderlands: Europeans and
Timucuans in Sixteenth-Century Florida
by J onathan DeCoster
n February 1566, grisly news reached the Norman port cities of
Dieppe and Le Havre. The French Huguenot colonists, who had
left those ports for Florida less than two years previously, had
been cruelly slaughtered by Spaniards. An open letter to France's
king, purportedly written by the widows and orphans of the victims,
was quickly published in an attempt to prod the crown into action.
"The blood of your poor subjects, thus treacherously spilt, cries
out before God for vengeance," it exclaimed. 1 When the crown
seemed deaf to the public outcry, a private citizen, Dominique de
Gourgues, felt driven to personally avenge his countrymen. An
anonymous contemporary text titled The Recovery ofFlorida tells the
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1.
"Requeste au Roy Faite par les Femmes Vefves Enfans Orphelins, Parens et
Amis de ses Suiets ont Este Cruellement Massacrez par les Hespagnols en la
France Antartique, Nommee la Floride" (1566), pages unnumbered. A copy is
reproduced in photostat as &queste Au RIYJ, Fails En Forme De Complainctes Par
Les Femmes &fues, & Enfans Orphelins, Parens & Amis De Ses Subjects: Qui Ont
Este Cruellement Massacres Par Les Espagnols, En La France Antarti Que Nommee
La Florida, Photostat Americana 231 (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society,
1929). The letter was also included in various editions of Nicolas le Challeux,
Discours De L'histoire De LaFloride (1566).

[375]

Published by STARS, 2012

1

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 91 [2012], No. 3, Art. 6

376

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

story of how in 1568 Gourgues convinced a small force of French
soldiers and sailors to recapture Florida for France. 2
· The Rec(J'(}ery ofFlorida praises the zeal and fearlessness of Gourgues,
but it also recognizes the extent to which his success depended on
the participation of indigenous allies. According to the narrative,
Gourgues knew that the French colonists had befriended some of
the natives several years earlier, and he expected them to willingly
augment his slim numbers against the Spaniards. As anticipated,
when Gourgues encountered Saturiwa, the leader of an alliance of
Timucua Indians, Saturiwa professed that he and his allies "had never
ceased to love the French because of the good treatment they had
received," and offered to provide the forces necessary to help the
French rout the Spaniards. 3 The text celebrates how, after the French
victory, Gourgues was greeted as a liberator by the Timucuans. One
old woman even proclaimed that "she did not mind dying now that
she had once more seen the French in Florida. "4
In most contemporary and modern accounts of this event,
the Timucuan allies of Saturiwa are seen to have eagerly joined
Gourgues because of their longstanding friendship with the
French and the maltreatment they had received from the
Spanish. 5 Implicit to such an interpretation is the assumption that

2.

3.
4.
5.

The Bibliotheque nationale de France (hereafter BNF) contains at least
7 manuscript copies of La Reprise [or Reprinse] de la Roride par /,e Cappitaine
Gourgue. A variant printed in 1568 residing at the Bibliotheque Mazarine was
reproduced in facsimile in 1928 by the Massachusetts Historical Society as
Histoire Memorab/,e De La Reprinse De L'is/,e De La Floride, Photostat Americana
220 (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1928). Another variant was
included in publications of Rene Goulaine de Laudonniere, L'histoire Notab/,e
De La Roride (Paris, 1586) . The quotes used in this article are taken from the
manuscript Fonds Frarn;:ais 6124, BNF.
La Reprise de laFloride, Fonds Frarn;:ais 6124, f. 12 recto, BNF.
Ibid, f. 27 recto.
Eugene Lyon, one of the most important historians of the Spaniards during this
period in Florida, typifies the way in which scholars have accepted this premise.
He writes, "The enemies of the French had, perforce, become friends of the
Spanish, and Indians who had allied with [the French] were now firmly united
against the Spaniards," in The Enterprise ofRorida:
Menendez
Pedro
De Avilis and the
Spanish Conquest of 1565-1568 (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1976),
198. While contemporary historians (including Lyon) might be sympathetic to
the possibility that native leaders such as Saturiwa exerted some degree of agency
in their negotiations with Europeans, most have agreed with him in identifying
European rivalry as the primary force behind such colonial interactions. For
example, see Paul E. Hoffman, A New Andalucia and a Way to the Orient: The
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the conflict in Florida was simply a peripheral outgrowth of the
rivalry between France and Spain originating in Europe. While
the events of the massacre and the reprisal undoubtedly serve as
excellent illustrations of how European conflicts were played out
on a smaller scale at the periphery of empires, a strict focus on the
Franco-Spanish dimension fails to take account of the indigenous
people who participated in the conflict. The Timucuans were not
simply co-opted by the European rivalry, but instead willingly chose
to take part in the Franco-Spanish dispute because of its utility for
their indigenous political interests.
Emphasizing this native-0riented dimension allows us to see how
the European experience in Florida was shaped not only by intraEuropean conflicts, but also by intra-Timucuan conflicts, played out
in part through European auxiliaries. Such an inversion requires
recasting the concept of a "borderland" as not just a peripheral zone
separating European empires but also indigenous polities. 6 In the
sixteenth century, most of Florida, and indeed the North American
continent, remained under undisputed native hegemony. In those
places, as Juliana Barr has put it, "the primary power relations were
not European versus Indian, but relations among native peoples." 7
Would-be colonists arrived on the continent to find themselves amid
preexisting rivalries and alliances that conditioned whether natives
would choose not only to adapt or resist, but also to assist colonial
incursions. Native leaders' choices had significant effects on European
colonies, and we cannot understand them apart from their native
political context. As representative examples of the relationships
commonly formed at the leading edge of colonial empires, the evershifting alliances between Europeans and Timucuans in the sixteenth
century help illustrate how these complex and entangled interactions
characterized imperial and native borderlands.

6.

7.

American Southeast During the Sixteenth Century (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1990), 218-230; and John T. McGrath, The French in Early
Florida: In the Eye of the Hurricane (Gainesville: University Press of Florida,
2000), 102-155. A notable exception is John H. Hann, A History of the Timucua
Indians and Missions (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996), 38-66.
For the native construction of borderlands, see Kathleen DuVal, The Native
Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 11; Pekka Hamalainen developed
the idea of indigenous empires in The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2008).
Juliana Barr, Peace Came in the Form of a Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas
Borderlands (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 6.
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The relationship between Saturiwa and Gourgues emerged from
a deeper and more ambivalent history between the French and their
riative neighbors. A year before the massacre in 1564, the French had
established their colony in an area inhabited by dense populations of
natives labeled by scholars as Timucuans. Anthropological linguists
define Timucuan as a distinct language family spoken across a broad
swath of northern Florida and southeastern Georgia. It had about
a dozen closely-related dialects. Perhaps as many as 20,000 Timucuaspeakers lived in this area in 1564. Their societies were stratified into a
hereditary nobility and a class of commoners, although commoners of
exceptional ability could rise into the elite class. Europeans recorded
the use of the terms holata, utina, and paracoussi to designate Timucuan
chiefs, yet it is not clear whether these terms indicated hierarchical levels,
local variation, or some other distinction for the Timucuans such as a
"peace" or "war" leader. These chiefs and important counselors inherited
their offices matrilineally, and while chiefs did not possess absolute
authority, they were treated deferentially and enjoyed privileges such
as the right to collect tribute and the right to exemption from certain
kinds of labor. Men usually filled these roles, though not exclusively.
These characteristics have led anthropologists to characterize the
Timucuan polities as simple chiefdoms, political entities with one level
of hierarchical social institutions above the local community. 8
The Timucuan chiefdoms emerged in the context of regional social
change generated by the rise of Mississippian chiefdoms in the interior
southeast around AD. 1000. Mississippian societies developed new
8.

Kathleen A Deagan, "Cultures in Transition: Fusion and Assimilation among the
Eastern Timucua," in Tacachole: Essays on the Indians ofFlorida and Southeastern Geargi,a
During the Historic Period, ed. Jerald T. Milanich and Samuel Proctor (Gainesville:
University Presses of Florida, 1978), 107; Ives Goddard, "The Indigenous Languages
of the Southeast," AnthropowgicalLinguistics47, no. I (Spring2005): 34, 10-ll;Julian
Granberry, "A Grammatical Sketch of Timucua," International Journal of American
Linguistics 56, no. 1 (1990): 60-61; Hann, History of the Timucua, 1-26; Jerald T.
Milanich, Lahoring in the Fields of the Lord: Spanish Missions and Southeastern Indians
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1999), 45-SO;Jerald T. Milanich, The
Timucua (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996) , 38-66;John E. Worth, The Timucuan
Chiefdoms ofspanishFlorida 2 vols.(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998), 1:418. The term "chiefdom" is widely used but also problematic. I use it in a broad
sense to mean simply a multi-<:ommunity political unit based on hierarchical social
institutions rather than kin-based egalitarianism. I use simple chiefdom to mean one
layer of control above the local community, and complex chiefdom to mean more
than one. See David G. Anderson, The Savannah River Chiefdoms: Political Change in the
Late Prehistoric Southeast (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1994) , 5-8. In line
with Timothy R Pauketat's critique, I eschew any implication of social evolution and
use the terms descriptively. See Pauketat, Chiefdoms and Other ArchaeowgicalDelusions
(New York: AltaMira Press, 2007) .
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levels of social stratification and political consolidation that supported
the creation of monumental earthworks, the expansion of agriculture,
and several other traits that scholars identify as markers of Mississippian
culture. They also began to maintain long-distance exchange networks;
Mississippian culture traveled along those exchange networks from the
core Mississippian area in the Mid-South to the Atlantic coast There, at
the eastern terminus of such exchange, the Timucuans could be said
to inhabit the periphery of the Mississippian world.9 Although smallerscaled and less complex than their Mississippian counterparts, Timucuan
chiefdoms came to encompass between two and ten villages organized
into ranked hierarchies, and temporary alliances could bring together
as many as forty chiefs under a single dominant leader. Anthropologists
and archaeologists estimate that twenty-five or thirty of these chiefdoms
may have existed when Europeans arrived in Florida.10 But as with other
Mississippian and Mississippian-like cultures, the growth of chiefdoms
displaced populations and increased competition for resources, leading
in tum to a rise in intersocietal conflict. In fact, the name "Timucua"
itself evolved from usage by Spanish colonists in the sixteenth century,
and seems to have been a pejorative meaning "enemy." Rather than a
self-designation, the term "Timucua" gestures towards the diversity and
competition among Timucuan-speaking polities. These longstanding
rivalries led the Timucuans to recruit the French newcomers as allies in
their intra-native conflicts at nearly every opportunity. 11
9.

Keith H . Ashley, "On the Periphery of the Early Mississippian World: Looking
Within and Beyond Northeastern Florida," Southeastern Archaeology 21, no. 2
(Winter 2002): 162-177; Charles R. Cobb, "Mississippian Chiefdoms: Ho.w
Complex?" Annual Review of Anthropology 32 (2003): 63-84.
10. Hann, History of the Timucua, 15-17; Milanich, Laboring in the Fields of the Lord,
45; Worth, The Timucuan Chiefdoms, 1:6-18.
11. The ethnohistorical evidence employed throughout this discussion
unequivocally points to intra-Timucuan conflict predating the arrival of
Europeans. The archaeological evidence, however, is more ambiguous. For
instance, the artwork of one of the French colonists, Jacques Le Moyne de
Morgues, depicts a palisaded village, a depiction reinforced by numerous
colonial documents. Evidence of palisades is usually interpreted by
archaeologists and anthropologists as a sign of longstanding conflict. See,
for example, George R. Milner, "Warfare in Prehistoric and Early Historic
Eastern North America," journal of Archaeological Research 7, no. 2 Qune 1999):
123-124. However, archaeologists have not located any evidence of palisades
in their limited excavations of eastern Timucuan sites. See Hann, History of
the Timucua, 88-89; Milner, 122-125; Rebecca Saunders, "Forced Relocation,
Power Relations, and Culture Contact in the Missions of La Florida," in Studies
in Culture Contact: Interaction, Culture Change, and Archaeology, ed. James G.
Cusick (Carbondale, IL: Center for Archaeological Investigations, Southern
Illinois University, 1998), 407, 412; Milanich, The Timucua, 132, 164-166.
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The French colonists encountered four major, mutually
hostile Timucuan polities during the fourteen months they spent
in northern Florida. The French fort was near the mouth of the
St. Johns River, where the colonists interacted most intensively
with the paracoussi12 Saturiwa and his affiliates. The French
were told that he ruled over thirty subordinate chiefs, which
would have corresponded to a capacity to field several thousand
men if necessary. Further up the St. Johns, the olata Outina led
a confederacy of some forty village chiefs deeply antagonistic
to Saturiwa's alliance. Less is known about the inland Potano
chiefdom, but in the 1560s it was considered nearly as powerful
as Saturiwa and Outina. When the French arrived in 1564, Outina
was already actively at war with both Saturiwa and Potano. Finally, a
pair of related chiefs, Houstaqua and Onatheaqua, resided further
to the west, beyond the normal range of interaction with Saturiwa
but regularly at odds with Outina. Houstaqua and Onatheaqua
may have been siblings, and each allegedly possessed a population
as great as or greater than Saturiwa's or Outina's polities. 13
Rene Goulaine de Laudonniere, the captain of the French
settlement, recognized that military assistance was perhaps the
most valuable asset he could offer the Timucuans. He believed that
he could exploit their animosity to draw them into alliances, yet
avoid alienating himself from their enemies by failing to actually
commit to violence. By maintaining favorable relationships with
mutually hostile Timucuan rivals, he hoped to retain the ability
to trade for food, gather information, and pass across Timucuan
borders to sources of gold and silver rumored to lie inland.
His meetings with Timucuans often focused on their rivalries,
giving him frequent opportunities to pledge French soldiers to
serve native leaders. He concluded his first such alliance with
Saturiwa around June 28, 1564, when Saturiwa revealed that
he considered Outina "his oldest and truest enemy." 14 Quickly
making the connection between his desires and Saturiwa's needs,
Laudonniere explained that "I understood what he wanted to say.
12.

13.
14.

Regardless of the locally used term, the French usually used the term roi and
the Spanish cacique to describe native leaders. On the few occasions that an
indigenous title was used by the French, it was paracoussi Saturiwa and olata
Outina. It is not clear what the distinction meant to the Timucuans.
Laudonniere, L'histoire Notable, passim; Worth, The Timucuan Chiefdoms, 1:1934.
Laudonniere, L'histoire Notable, f. 42 recto.
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And to make him better love me, I promised to join him with all
my power when he wanted to fight, something that pleased him
greatly." 15 But to Saturiwa's disappointment, Laudonniere delayed
fulfilling his commitment. In fact, the French captain made
covert contact with members of Outina's alliance. In an effort to
entice the French into helping him attack Outina, Saturiwa had
told them that his rival's upriver location granted him access to
the Appalachian Mountains, the source of the Timucuans' silver.
But Saturiwa's ploy backfired; this information made Outina
appear a more potentially valuable ally than the coastal Saturiwa.
Upon making contact, Laudonniere's lieutenant promised one of
Outina's subordinates that one day the French would bring their
forces to join him against Houstaqua and Onatheaqua. 16 The
French would eventually make contact with Houstaqua, too, and
make a similar offer to join with him and "put all of the rest of the
people under obedience to us." 17 With each step further inland,
Laudonniere offered to help the Timucuan leaders against all of
their other rivals. The strategy was a house of cards, effective only
as long as the French captain could avoid committing to any one of
the Timucuans and turning all the others against him.
Frustrated with the delay and possibly apprised of the meetings
with Outina, Saturiwa pressed Laudonniere to, as the Frenchman
understood it, "carry out the promise that I had made when
I had first landed in this country, to show myself a friend of his
friends and an enemy of his enemies." 18 Laudonniere responded
by expressing a desire to avoid entanglement in these Timucuan
rivalries. "For his friendship I did not want to gain the enmity
of another," he told the disappointed Saturiwa. 19 Laudonniere
claimed the role of a disinterested peace broker, yet gaining the
friendship of one Timucuan chief at the expense of another was
precisely his strategy. He offered that if Saturiwa could be reconciled
with Outina, they could both unite with the French against their
common enemies, Houstaqua and Onatheaqua. Rather than
alienate Saturiwa outright, he still tried to maintain a semblance of
the alliance that he knew remained a potent bargaining chip with
the Timucuan paracoussi. Laudonniere found this policy difficult
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Ibid.
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

f. 49 verso.
f. 76 verso.
f. 53 recto.
f . 53 verso.
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to sustain, however. Saturiwa ostensibly agreed to the proposal of
reconciliation with Outina, but even Laudonniere could read the
growing resentment behind the friendly facade. 20
In September, Laudonniere dispatched his lieutenants Michel
le Vasseur and Thiebaud d'Arlac with ten soldiers to Outina's village
to make peace between the rivals. The Timucuan olata seems to
have welcomed the arrival of French soldiers, and he requested
they join him in an attack against his rival Potano. Outina may have
recognized the difficulty in turning the French against Saturiwa,
or he may have been more interested in exerting his power into
the interior than downriver into Saturiwa's coastal plain. For the
French soldiers, residence at Fort Caroline had seemed an unjust
imprisonment, calculated to rob them of the conquests for which
they had come to Florida. Outina had sent enough gifts to the fort
to convince the soldiers that he could provide them with better
access to the riches they sought than Saturiwa, and they grew
restive under Laudonniere's restraint. 21 Like Laudonniere, they
too expected to manipulate native rivalries, but they favored a
more active role. "The Spaniards," they argued, "when they made
their gains, always allied with some king to ruin the other." 22 For
both Laudonniere and his men, the exploitation of native conflict
was a key strategy. They simply differed on their opinion of how
much to commit themselves to a single Timucuan leader.
Although Laudonniere had thus far avoided actual fighting on
behalf of any Timucuans, in his absence his lieutenant, D'Arlac,
agreed to Outina's request to provide six French arquebusiers
for the attack on Potano. With the French firearms positioned at
the front of Outina's 200 warriors, the combined force easily took
the town, with only one Frenchman killed during the fighting.
The French captain had intended to avoid entanglement in the
Timucuan rivalries, but now the French were finally engaged on
behalf of Outina, a commitment that increased the complexity of
their relationships with the other Timucuans. 23

20. Ibid., f. 53 verso-56 recto.
21. Jacques Le Moyne de Morgues, "Narrative ofJacques Le Moyne de Morgues," in
The Work ofJacques Le Mayne De Morgues: A Huguenot Artist in France, Flmida, and
England, ed. P. H. Hulton, trans. Neil M. Cheshire, 2 vols. (London: Published
for the Trustees of the British Museum by British Museum Publications, 1977),
1:122-124.
22. Laudonniere, L'histoire Notabl,e, f. 77 verso.
23. Ibid., f. 59 recto-60 recto.
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Over the winter of 1564-1565, Outina requested another strike
against Potano. Entangled in an increasingly complicated web,
Laudonniere hesitated. But fearing the unrest and dissension
that already racked Fort Caroline, he submitted to the will of the
soldiers. Thirty Frenchmen joined 300 of Outina's men for a second
joint victory against Potano. 24 At first this seemed to bode well
for the ability of the French to replicate the kind of intercultural
cooperation that had led directly to spectacular Spanish successes
in other parts of the New World, but in fact the Timucuan rivalries
proved difficult to manage. In the aftermath of the victory, Outina
dispatched a squadron of messengers to loudly proclaim the
victory among the Timucuans. This not only served to spread the
word of Outina's increased military might, but it also alienated the
French from any Timucuans who considered themselves Outina's
rivals. Saturiwa had already expressed a growing resentment of
Laudonniere's inconstancy, and as word of the Franco-Outina
victory over Potano reached other adversaries of Outina, many sent
emissaries to Fort Caroline hoping to turn Laudonniere against
his new ally. But with these two strikes, Outina had successfully
supplanted his rivals. He had become the only military ally of
the French, and the permanent presence of French soldiers now
preemptively guarded his village from other Timucuans who would
be reluctant to alienate the French colony.
Saturiwa and his cohort now refused to trade with the
French. This left Outina as practically their only trading partner,
a development that introduced a dangerous sort of dependency
for the French colony. Laudonniere had prudently traded for food
throughout the fall and stored it for the difficult winter, anticipating
the arrival of French supply ships in late spring, but when the ships
failed to appear by May, Saturiwa's rejection left Outina as virtually
their only source of food. Laudonniere had previously hoped to
avoid this vulnerability by withholding his commitment to any
single one of the Timucuans, but now the French were compelled
to protect Outina's village and its stored corn from retaliation by
Potano. Their interests had become increasingly entangled, to
Laudonniere's chagrin. 25
The French soldiers had hoped that their support for Outina
against Potano would stand them in good stead, but Outina's
24.
25.

Ibid., f. 74 recto.
Ibid., f. 79 recto-79 verso.
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Theodor de Bry, "How the King Outina Defeated His Enemy Patanou with the Help
of the French," Grands Voyages, America, Part 2 (1591), State Archives of Florida,
Florida Memory, http:/ / floridamemor.com/ items/ show/ 254323?id=l3.

Timucuans now began to exploit the French in their trading,
demanding exorbitant rates on the rare occasions they agreed
to trade at all. As Laudonniere himself grimly mused, "thus
one commonly sees that necessity changes men's affections." 26
Furthermore, in the vulnerability of the French, Outina saw an
opportunity to further antagonize his Timucuan enemies. He
communicated to Laudonniere that he wished to take prisoner
a disobedient subordinate named Astina, and he once again
requested military assistance. The French would find food atAstina's
village, he implied, which they could loot after the completion of
their task. Laudonniere agreed to provide the soldiers, but Outina
deployed them instead against other enemies. Laudonniere's
account leaves unclear the means of Outina's deception or the
true target of the French soldiers, but there can be no doubt as to
the rage and indignation felt by the French soldiers who had been
deceived. Yet still, Laudonniere feared to retaliate. 27 As the colonists
26.
27.

Ibid., f. 82 verso.
Laudonniere, L'histoire Notable, f. 82 recto-83 verso; Le Moyne, "Narrative,"
1:125.
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neared starvation, the French captain found himself on the wrong
end of his own manipulations. Outina had used his influence over
the food supply to dominate the French trading negotiations and
strong-arm them into fighting against their will. He had benefitted
immensely by welcoming European colonists into his territory and
he clearly remained focused on turning French guns against his
native rivals. However, French acquiescence was about to end.
Reluctantly, Laudonniere allowed the soldiers in Fort Caroline
to persuade him to capture Outina and ransom him for food. The
French captain feared inciting the Timucuans further, but he feared
his rebellious soldiers more. A French force successfully abducted
Outina in late April or early May 1565, but the action failed to
generate the hoped-for delivery of food. Instead, Laudonniere
recorded the development of a power struggle within Outina's
alliance that diminished French hopes of any ransom. Two factions
now competed to name his replacement, and they appeared to
show little concern for their former leader (although there is the
possibility that this was a strategy in which Outina was complicit).
The French believed that the ransom negotiations served only to
buy time until an opportunity should arise to capture Laudonniere
or attack the French colony, and indeed, on July 27, Outina's
Timucuans ambushed a French party, initiating a period of open
warfare. 28
The break with Outina failed to accomplish its intended aim
of securing food for the colonists, but it did open the door for a
rapprochement with Saturiwa and his allies. Soon after Outina's
capture, Saturiwa's messengers began arriving at Fort Caroline
asking that the rival olata be executed or released to them. In
exchange, they offered as much food as the French might need.
Laudonniere refused to surrender Outina, but he and the other
French colonists nonetheless took advantage of the opportunity to
obtain food from several villages associated with Saturiwa. After the
outbreak of full-blown fighting with Outina in late July, the reunion
with Saturiwa seemed complete, and the newly reconciled allies
filled the French boats with corn. 29

28.

29.

Laudonniere, L'histoire Notable, f. 83 recto-90 verso. Hann, History of the Timucua,
45, suggests that the factions were composed of Outina's son, his patrilineal
heir, competing against his eldest sister's oldest son, his matrilineal heir.
Laudonniere, L'histoire Notable, f. 85 recto, 93 recto.
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It appeared then that Saturiwa had finally triumphed over
Outina. He had regained his position as the primary French ally and
-trading partner, and French soldiers were now finally willing to fight
against his rivals. As helpful as the reconciliation with Saturiwa was
for the French, though, they had learned that they could not safely
depend on the paracoussi and his food to preserve the settlement,
and they would still need reinforcements and supplies from France
if they hoped to survive in the long term. With the French ships four
months overdue, the colonists lost hope in such deliverance, and
they readied their own makeshift boats for the retreat home. 30
As Laudonniere prepared to depart, he regretted the rift with
Outina but he argued that his reconciliation with Saturiwa ameliorated,
perhaps even compensated, for the failure. With little else to show for
his fourteen months in Florida, he held up the alliance with Saturiwa as
a triumph, and indeed the primary objective of his enterprise, stating,
"Yet, I lost not the alliance of eight neighboring kings and lords, who
always succored me with everything that was possible. Indeed, this
was the main point of all my designs, to win and hold them, knowing
how much their friendship was important for our enterprise." 31 In
point of fact, they had not always kept him supplied with all that he
needed; that was merely the tentative state of affairs as he planned
his departure. Even then, Laudonniere promised that the French
would help Saturiwa defeat his rival Timucuans, as he had vowed so
many times before, writing "I gave them to understand that within ten
moons (as they call their months), I would see them again with such
force that I would render them victorious over all their enemies. "32
For Saturiwa, this promise was encouraging, but he pressed for still
more. Until their return, he requested that Laudonniere hand over
one of the small boats and leave Fort Caroline intact for protection
against Outina and other rivals. To this Laudonniere reluctantly
agreed, hoping to remain on friendly terms until his departure. Both
Laudonniere and Saturiwa tacitly understood that any cooperation
between the French and the Timucuans was dependent on its utility
for Saturiwa's rivalries with other Timucuans, and should that utility
diminish, the "friendship" would be withdrawn.
In a striking twist of fate, just as Laudonniere waited for
favorable winds to carry the colonists back to France, on August
28, 1565 Jean Ribault's reinforcement fleet arrived. Ribault was
30.
31.
32.

Ibid., f. 93 recto-93 verso.
Ibid., f. 94 recto.
Ibid., f. 98 verso.
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followed promptly by Pedro Menendez de Aviles on September 4.
Menendez was bent on destroying the colony whose inhabitants
had so recently decided to abandon it. The violent encounter
between French and Spanish colonists in Florida has been treated
extensively elsewhere, but a cursory sketch will be helpful here.
Menendez immediately challenged the French ships anchored
outside the mouth of the River of May. Ribault opted to reload all
of his best soldiers and fight Menendez at sea, but a rising hurricane
scattered the French fleet. Menendez managed to disembark his
soldiers some forty miles south of the fort (where he established
the town of St. Augustine), and, with the assistance of unnamed
native guides, took advantage of the hurricane to effect a surprise
overland assault on the fort. The wounded soldiers and tradesmen,
left behind at the fort because they had been deemed useless for
Ribault's fleet, put up little resistance. The Spaniards easily took Fort
Caroline. Within days, Indians reported to Menendez the wreck of
the French ships scattered by the storm. Menendez sent soldiers to
meet them, and the remaining French surrendered to the Spaniards
in three groups, on September 29, October 11, and November 1.
In the first two cases nearly all the prisoners were put to the knife,
while in the third Menendez took captive all who surrendered. The
sources disagree about the precise numbers involved, but perhaps
200-300 French were executed, another 175 or so were captured,
some fifty escaped to the small French ships in the harbor at Fort
Caroline, and as many as 220 voluntarily fled to the Timucuans,
preferring their chances with the Indians over the Spaniards. 33
33.

Lyon, Enterprise of Florida, covers the Spanish perspective comprehensively, as
does McGrath the French in Eye of the Hurricane. The most important primary
sources are Nicolas Le Challeux, Discours De L'histoire De La Floride, Contenant La
Trahison Des Espagnol.s, Cantre Les Subiets Du Ruy, En Lan Mil Cinq Gens Soixante
Cinq (Dieppe, 1566), 22-54; Laudonniere, L'histoire Notable, f. 99 recto-114
recto; Francisco Lopez de Mendoza Grajales, "Memoria del buen suc;:esso y
buen Viaje que dios nuestro senor fue servido de dar a la armada que salio
de la c;:iudad de caliz para la prouinc;:ia y costa de la florida .. .," 1565, Patronato
19, R.17, Archivo General de lndias (hereafter AGI); Le Moyne, "Narrative,"
1:131-134; Pedro Menendez de Aviles to King Philip II, October 15, 1565,
transcribed in Colecci6n de Documentos Ineditos Para La Historia De Espana, ed.
Martin Navarrete, Miguel Salva, and Pedro Sainz de Baranada 112 vols. (Madrid:
Im pr. de la Viuda de Calero, 1842-95), 14: f. 288 verso-300 recto; "Memorial
que hizo el Dr. Gonzalo Solis de Meras, de todas las jornadas y sucesos del
Adelantado Pedro Menendez de Aviles, su cunado, y de la conquista de la
Florida, yjusticia que hizo en Juan Ribao y otros franceses," printed in Eugenio
Ruidfaz y Caravia, La Florida: Su Conquista y Colonizaci6n Por Pedro Menendez De
Avilis2 vols.(Madrid: Imp. de los hijos de]. A. Garcia, 1893), 1:169-226.
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The French and Spanish accounts of their clash accord little
role to the Timucuans, but in fact, the Indians played key roles in
-shaping the encounter, and even their absences reveal conscious
decisions about their participation in the European rivalry. Befitting
the supposed alliance between the French and Saturiwa, the
paracoussi's subordinate ally Emoloa kept Laudonniere informed
on Spanish movements. He reported that the Spaniards had seized
the houses of the Timucuans at the village of Seloy, about forty
miles south of Fort Caroline, a description that implies at least
some degree of resistance to the newcomers. 34 In contrast, Spanish
accounts record the gracious welcome they received at Seloy and
the deep hostility to the French among the natives in its vicinity. 35 It
is unclear whether Seloy was considered part of Saturiwa's alliance,
so the meaning of this discrepancy is ambiguous. If Seloy was
ostensibly allied to Saturiwa and thus the French, the difference
between the representations may indicate an effort by Saturiwa to
court both the French and the Spanish, receiving the Spaniards
kindly but giving the French the impression that they had been
resisted. Indeed, the Spanish found two brothers at Seloy who were
very familiar with Fort Caroline, having visited only six days prior,
implying the presence at Seloy of at least some Timucuans friendly
to the French and Saturiwa. 36
The Seloy natives apprised Menendez of the potential size of
the French forces and their relationships with various Timucuan
leaders, and the two brothers familiar with Fort Caroline volunteered
to lead the Spanish expedition as guides. It was also likely Seloy
Indians who communicated the location of the French castaways
to Menendez after his capture of the French fort. Unfortunately
the Spanish records provide little clarity on the Seloy natives'
motivations, as the Spaniards had not yet learned to distinguish
any of the native polities, referring to them generically as "indios"
and individual leaders as "caciques" without specific appellation.
For the Seloy Indians, alliance with the Spaniards against Saturiwa
may have represented an opportunity to strike at an enemy or a
tyrannical overlord. If they resented the treatment of the French
specifically, they took a risk helping the Spanish, an unknown
34.
35.
36.

Laudonniere, L'histoire Notable, f. 106 recto.
Mendoza Grajales, "Memoria del buen su~esso," 6 verso-7 recto.
Laudonniere, L'histoire Notable, f. 106 recto; Mendoza Grajales, "Memoria de!
buen su~esso," f. 6 verso-7 recto; Solis de Mer.is in Ruidiaz y Caravia, La Florida,
1:80, 95.
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entity, supplant the French, who had recently been brought under
control by Saturiwa. 37
Without the guidance ofTimucuans living south of Fort Caroline,
the Spanish fleet could not have located the French settlement
before Ribault unloaded his reinforcements and supplies, nor could
Menendez have orchestrated his surprise overland raid. But perhaps
more significant is the complete absence of Saturiwa and his allies
from the conflict. The Timucuans in the area clearly understood that
the Spaniards planned to attack the fort, and Saturiwa's ally Emoloa
obviously had access to news coming from Seloy, yet Saturiwa made
no effort to assist the French against the Spaniards. Furthermore,
the Seloy guides' familiarity with Fort Caroline, located in the heart
of Saturiwa's territory, might imply that they acted with his consent
or under his direction. In either case, if Saturiwa did not encourage
the Spanish capture of the fort, he did not try to prevent it either.
His alliance with the French apparently did not extend to protecting
them from their European rivals, at least not until it became clear
who was likely to prevail.
The abrupt termination of the French colony has led to an
oversimplification of its relationship with Saturiwa. Saturiwa,
the French, and the Spaniards all perpetuated the fiction that
Saturiwa and his allies "had never ceased to love the French"
because it fit well into the narratives they each created to explain
subsequent events.38 Modern historians have generally accepted
this static interpretation, but the evidence indicates otherwise. 39
The relationship had evolved over its first fourteen months from a
promising alliance, through a period of tense hostility, and finally
into a tepid agreement for Saturiwa to provide food for the French
to maintain their war against Outina. Had the French remained,
it doubtless would have continued to change. But because the
relationship was cut off, the impression given in the autumn of
1565 became essentialized as an enduring friendship. Furthermore,
the Spanish fear of retaliation bred a persistent belief in such an
alliance, even in the face of contradictory evidence.
37. Mendoza Grajales, "Memoria del buen sm;:esso," f. 6 verso-7 recto; Menendez
de Aviles to Philip II, September 11, 1565, in Navarrete, Co/,ecci6n, 14:f. 285
recto; Menendez de Aviles to Philip II, October 15, 1565, in ibid. , f. 289 recto,
290 recto; Menendez de Aviles to Philip II, December 5, 1565, in ibid., f. 300
verso.
38. La Reprise de la Floride, f. 12 recto.
39. See note 5 above.

Published by STARS, 2012

15

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 91 [2012], No. 3, Art. 6

390

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

Menendez estimated that 150 French colonists had escaped
him and found refuge with the Timucuans, and he believed that
the ongoing potential of a combined Franco-Saturiwa retaliation
posed a grave threat. Because of this, he immediately began
negotiating with Timucuan leaders to have the French captives
turned over to him, and he fretted constantly about the supposedly
friendly relations between the French and the natives. This concern,
however, was temporarily eclipsed by the need for provisions for his
newfound colony. Menendez believed that the danger of the French
alliances with Florida's natives would only be magnified if French
reinforcements arrived, but he also recognized that starvation would
compel his own soldiers to alienate the Timucuans. Of all the hazards
for a new settlement, he considered a shortage of food the most
pressing, and he left in November to procure supplies in Havana. 40
As he prepared to depart, Menendez still held out hope that
Saturiwa could be peeled away from the French. "On this river
there are large settlements of Indians, and they all are great friends
of the French that were there ... [but] all the Indians do not have
such perfect peace with them that they cannot have a firmer one
with us, because I will not allow a grain of maize to be taken from
them," he reported to Philip 11. 41 Menendez's reports to the crown
missed few opportunities to laud his own singular abilities, and the
ease with which he expected to win native allies reveals some of
the credulity to which he was sometimes given, particularly when
Indians told him what he wanted to hear. But he had real reason
to feel encouraged by what he had seen in his short encounter
with the Timucuans. From September to November of 1565, the
relationship between the Spaniards and Saturiwa's Timucuans was
apparently intimate enough to encourage many of the Indians
to relocate their dwellings closer to the former French fort now
renamed San Mateo, presumably for better access to European
trade goods. Also, around September 20, Saturiwa turned over to
Menendez several of the Frenchmen who had sought refuge with
him. All signs indicated that the Timucuan paracoussi 's dedication
to his French friends was less than absolute, despite Menendez's

40.

41.

Menendez de Aviles to Philip II, October 15, 1565, in Navarrete, Colecci6n, 14:f.
289 verso, 291 verso, 293 recto-293 verso, 298 verso, 299 verso; Menendez de
Aviles to Philip II, December 5, 1565, in ibid., f. 301 recto, 303 recto.
Menendez de Aviles to Philip II, October 15, 1565, in ibid., f. 293 recto-293
verso.
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persistently voiced fear of their close friendship and potential for
combined retaliation. 42
While Menendez wintered in Spain, however, the soldiers in
Florida appear to have undermined whatever goodwill had been
earned. They repeatedly antagonized Saturiwa and his people,
eventually killing three of his high-ranked allies. Relations had so
deteriorated that when some of Saturiwa's Timucuans captured the
Spaniard Rodrigo Troche in March 1566, the paracoussi ordered his
heart tom out of his living chest. By May, Saturiwa had killed over
100 Spaniards and burned the fort at St. Augustine. The constant
attacks forced the Spaniards to relocate St. Augustine to a more
removed location at the entrance to the bar, a stark contrast with
the Timucuans' own desire to live closer to the Spaniards at San
Mateo only half a year before. 43
Menendez, the frustrated commander, attributed the conflict
largely to the unruliness of the common soldiers who seem to
have lived in a near-constant state of rebellion. The chronic food
shortages that plagued French and Spanish Florida in these years
also suggest that demands for food likely played a central role
in the soldiers' depredations. However, it may be significant that
while Saturiwa made multiple overtures for an alliance during the
autumn, Menendez neglected to follow up on the opportunity.
Preoccupied with exploring the rest of his newly-won territory, he
failed to make any contact with Saturiwa until late August 1566, a
year after his arrival in Florida. At that point he was rudely rebuffed
by Saturiwa's subordinates without even meeting the paracoussi,
who may have resented the failure of the Spanish governor to
respond to his friendly gestures. Rejected by Saturiwa, within
days Menendez found Outina cautiously willing to accept an
alliance with the Spaniards. Thus, by the time Menendez finally
met Saturiwa in person for the first time in March 1567, he had
neglected the paracoussi for a full year-and-a-half after settling in
the heart of his territory. Saturiwa surely had noticed that by then
Menendez had already been allied with Outina for six months. 44

42. Lyon, Enter
prise of Florida, 123; Solis de Meras in Ruidfaz y Caravia, La Florida,
1:181.
43. Solis de Meras in Ruidfaz y Caravia, La Florida, 1:181 , 217-221.
44. Menendez de Aviles to Philip II, October 20, 1566, in John H. Hann, Missions
to the Calusa (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1991) , 358; Solfs de Meras
in Ruidfaz y Caravia, La Florida, 1:248-251, 256-257.
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Regardless of whether Saturiwa's hostility stemmed from such
a perceived insult, his first meeting with Menendez quickly soured.
According to Gonzalo Solfs de Meras, Menendez' brother-in-law,
Saturiwa angrily revealed "that though he had many times said
to the captains of [Menendez] that he was his friend, he had not
said this with a pure heart, because he held all the Christians for
enemies, and that [Menendez] and his soldiers were hens and
cowards." 45 If true, this obviously had not prevented Saturiwa from
seeking advantageous relationships with either the French or the
Spaniards, but it helps explain his willingness to quickly abandon any
inter-cultural alliance when it threatened to outlive its usefulness,
and it undermines the characterization of the Franco-Timucuan
alliance as an enduring friendship forged in united opposition to
Spanish cruelty. Of course, it simplified matters for the Spaniards
to characterize Saturiwa as duplicitous and inexorably antagonistic
to Europeans, and we have only their account of this "confession."
But the fact remained that Saturiwa had not defended the French
from the initial Spanish attack, and had instead sought an alliance
with Menendez. Far from being subsumed by the European
conflict, Saturiwa dissimulated and chose opportune moments
when participation on either side might serve his own ends.
Menendez left for Spain on May 18, 1567, not long after his
ill-fated attempt to reconcile with Saturiwa. 46 In a meeting with
Philip II on July 20, he tried to marginalize his native problems,
claiming that he had befriended all of the leaders within 300
leagues of St. Augustine with the sole exception of the paracoussi
Saturiwa. 47 But contrary to his depiction, it appears that it was
in fact Outina who was isolated from the other Timucuans, not
Saturiwa. At nearly the same time that Menendez met with Philip,
the Spanish chaplain Mendoza Grajales wrote a letter to the absent
Menendez explaining that the Spanish garrisons had been forced
to send eighty soldiers to protect Outina from the united attacks of
Saturiwa, Nocoroco, Potano, and others. Although brief, Mendoza
Grajales' reference implies a unification ofTimucuans who had not

45.
46.

47.

Solis de Meras in Ruidfaz y Caravia, La Florida, 1:300-301.
Bartolome de Barrientos, Vida y Hechos de Pero Menendez de Aviles, printed in
Dos antiguas relaciones de la Florida, ed. Genaro Garcia (Mexico: J. Aguilar Vera
y Comp., 1902), 144.
Barrientos in Garcia, Dos Antiguas Relaciones, 145; Solfs de Meras in Ruidfaz y
Caravia, LaFlorida, 1:317.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol91/iss3/6

18

DeCoster: Entangled Borderlands: Europeans and Timucuans in Sixteenth-Centu

ENTANGLED BORDERLANDS

393

previously cooperated with one another and had in fact functioned
as rivals. His vagueness only hints at the true extent of cooperation
-against the new Spanish-Outina alliance, but clearly some kind of
new opposition had coalesced. 48
Without question the Spanish colony provoked this disruption
of the pre-existing Timucuan political economy, and the Spanish
forts served as the targets of much of the aggression ofSaturiwa and
his new allies. But in the incident mentioned by Mendoza Grajales,
many of the Timucuans targeted Outina, not the Spaniards. Potano,
who had been repeatedly attacked by the combined Outina-French
forces in 1564 and 1565, had little to gain from making enemies of
the Spanish but much to gain from the defeat of Outina. "As he
saw himself harassed he sent for help and as a friend we sent it to
him," wrote the chaplain, demonstrating how the Spaniards, under
constant assault from Saturiwa, nonetheless felt compelled to
dispatch a large force of soldiers to defend Outina from Potano. 49
Unwittingly echoing Laudonniere, Menendez had written of the
Indians that "I have not wanted to befriend any [leader] in order
to make war with his enemy, even though he might also be my
enemy," but this proved impossible in the Timucuan borderlands. 50
Europeans invariably found themselves tangled in the web of
political relationships tying the Timucuans together.
While the Spaniards tried to navigate these political
relationships, outrage steadily built in France over Menendez's
actions in 1564. One of the survivors, the carpenter Nicolas le
Challeux, published a lurid description that proved particularly
effective in galvanizing the public. His narrative held a special
resonance for Dominique de Gourgues, a minor gentleman who
had served the French crown for twenty years in Scotland, Piedmont,
and the Levant. He had once been captured by the Spaniards and
imprisoned as a galley slave, and this doubtless added to his spirited
48.

49.
50.

Mendoza Grajales to Menendez de Aviles, August 6, 1567, translated in "Letters
of Pedro Menendez de Aviles and Other Documents Relative to His Career,
1555-1574," trans. Edward W. Lawson (St. Augustine, 1955, unpublished
manuscript at the St. Augustine Historical Society), 328-332 (hereafter,
Lawson, "Letters"); also mentioned in Juan Ripalta, "Indios de la costa de
Florida," January 18, 1573, Patronato 257, N .l , G.3, R.20, AGL
Mendoza Grajales to Menendez de Aviles, August 6, 1567, in Lawson, "Letters,"
330.
Pedro Menendez de Aviles to Diego Avellaneda, October 15, 1566, printed
in Monumenta Antiquae Roridae (1566-1572), ed. Felix Zubillaga (Rome:
Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu, 1946), 93.
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response to the news. He had previously made several voyages to
Africa and South America, so he would not have attracted especial
-notice when he left Bordeaux on August 2, 1567 to "make war on
the negroes" in Benin. 51 From Africa he made his way to Cuba,
where he surprised his soldiers and crew by revealing his ultimate
aim: to take revenge on the Spaniards in Florida. He needed to
convince his men to take on the challenge, but he carried one of
the former colonists with him as a guide and interpreter, proof
that he had planned the scheme in advance. He reached Florida
in mid-April 1568,just after Menendez departed Spain with a small
relief fleet for the colony. 52
The R.ecovery of Florida, the anonymous French text sometimes
attributed to Gourgues himself, emphasizes his cleverness in
taking advantage of native allies to effect his revenge. "When he
[Gourgues] arrived in Florida," it reads, "he shrewdly associated
with the savages and well understood how to make use of them and
thus to make up for the scarcity of men he brought." 53 The French
commander fortuitously landed at the village ofTacatacuru, an ally
of Saturiwa. 54 Tacatacuru enjoyed a particularly odious reputation
among the Spaniards for allegedly slaying the Jesuit priest Pedro
Martinez, and he stood accused of several other Spanish deaths.
Before leaving for Spain, Menendez had left specific instructions
that Tacatacuru be hunted down and killed. 55 As a specially-targeted
enemy of the Spaniards, then, Tacatacuru presented Gourgues with
an ideal accomplice for his avowed strategy of using the Indians to
defeat the Spaniards.
Gourgues fit equally well into the plans of Tacatacuru and his
Timucuan allies. The text records that Gourgues was greeted warmly
as a liberator, first by Tacatacuru, then by a hastily-called assembly
of Saturiwa and his allies. According to the French text, Saturiwa
complained to Gourgues of the ills they had suffered "because
of the friendship they had contracted with the French," yet he
assured Gourgues that "they had never ceased to love the French
because of the good treatment they had received from them when

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

La Reprinse de la Floride, f. 4 verso.
Charles La Ronciere, Histoire de la marine Jranr;aise (Paris: E. Pion, Nourrit,
1899), 64; La Reprinse de la Floride, f. 3 verso-9 verso.
La Reprinse de la Floride, f. 30 recto.
Ibid., f. 10 recto.
Barrientos in Garcia, Dos Antiguas Relaciones, 141.
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they commanded there. "56 Indeed, the fear of a Franco-Timucuan
alliance had kept the Spaniards on edge, but the actual interactions
between the Spaniards and the Timucuans were more ambivalent
than the Spaniards generally represented. Saturiwa and Menendez
had both demonstrated interest in an alliance that had failed to
coalesce primarily because of Menendez's extended absences, not
because the Franco-Saturiwa alliance proved an inviolable bond.
But the anonymous narrative, like the writings of the Spaniards,
perpetuates the myth of an ongoing Franco-Saturiwa relationship.
The register of the assembly taken by the French author
conspicuously omits any mention of Potano or Nocoroco, Saturiwa's
allies as recorded by Mendoza Grajales, or any other Timucuans
outside of the immediate vicinity of San Mateo. The broader
coalition that had attacked Outina the previous summer may have
been too distant to assemble on short notice or simply uninterested
in joining an assault on the Spanish fort. The latter is the more likely
explanation because, contrary to the French text, Spanish sources
record that Saturiwa and Tacatacuru did not await the appearance of
the French for deliverance, and had already assembled their forces
before Gourgues' arrival. The Spaniards had suffered sporadic
attacks by Saturiwa and his allies for well over a year. According
to one Spanish official, less than two weeks previously 400 Indians
had made a concerted assault on San Mateo. 57 This ongoing conflict
offers a more convincing explanation for their eagerness to attack
the Spanish than any lingering loyalty to the French. "Have no fear,"
said the gathered allies of Saturiwa to Gourgues, "we wish them
more ill than you do. "58
The combined forces of 400 Timucuans and 100 Frenchman
attacked San Mateo and two small blockhouses, routing their
inhabitants and killing every Spaniard they laid hands on. While
Outina was not directly involved in the Franco-Saturiwa attack on
San Mateo, there are hints that the Spaniards' ongoing affiliation
with Outina might have partly motivated Saturiwa and his allies
to join with Gourgues and the French soldiers. Upon receiving
word of the assault, Esteban de las Alas, an official at St. Augustine,
pied for help from Outina, indicating that their alliance was still
quite intact. Unaware that the fort had already been lost, Las Alas
56.
57.
58.

La Reprinse de la Floride, f. 12 recto.
Esteban de las Alas to Philip II, May 5, 1568, Patronato 254, N.l, G.2, R.l, AGL
La Reprinse de la Roride, f. 13 recto.
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asked Outina to send six men to deliver messages to the besieged
Spaniards under the cover of darkness. Yet before Las Alas had
even dispatched his request to Outina, a small contingent of
panicked Spanish soldiers had already gone to Outina's village
seeking refuge. 59 Several years later, two Timucuan leaders tied to
the Spaniards complained that their villages had been attacked by
Saturiwa and his allies during the assault. This might imply that
the assault on the fort offered an opportunity to settle intra-native
conflicts not directly related to hostility against the Spaniards or
friendship with the French. 60
In the aftermath of the victory, Gourgues had no intention of
replanting a French colony in Florida. He chose not to challenge
the other Spanish settlements at St. Augustine and Santa Elena
either. Instead, after briefly reveling in his triumph, he joined
Saturiwa's Timucuans in razing the fort and then departed.
Surprisingly, despite Saturiwa's central role in the destruction of
San Mateo, in the ensuing months the Spaniards still entertained
the prospect of reconciliation. 61 Saturiwa's close ally Emoloa made
overtures to them just two months after Gourgues' visit, leading
the Spaniards to believe that a turnabout for Saturiwa still might
be possible. 62
In fact, the Spaniards may have pursued peace because
Saturiwa no longer figured as the leader of their opposition.
Rumors reached St. Augustine that Gourgues had intended to
build a permanent fort at the village of Tacatacuru, and by the
end of 1568 that was where the Timucuans hostile to the Spanish
presence gathered. 63 The island on which Tacatacuru lived may
have offered a more strategic site from which to mount a defense,
or Tacatacuru's polity may have begun to eclipse Saturiwa's as the
dominant power and the leader of the opposition in the region.
59.
60.

Esteban de las Alas to Philip II, May 5, 1568, Patronato 254, N.l , G.2, R.l , AGL
Cedulario of Florida, 1573, Santo Domingo 2528, L.l , 69-71 , AGI, cited in
Hann, History of the Timucua, 138.
61. Juan Rogel to Francisco de Borgia, July 25, 1568, printed in Zubillaga,
Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 324.
62 . Antonio Sedeno to Francisco de Borgia, November 17, 1568, printed in
Zubillaga, Mon umenta A ntiquae Floridae, 352.
63. Antonio de Prado to Philip II, "Memorial de los fuertes y gente que a de aber a
la florida," November 16, 1569, trans.Jeannette M. Thurber Connor, Colonial
Records of Spanish Florida Letters and Reports of Governors and Secular Persons,
Publications of the Florida State Historical Society 5, 2 vols (Deland: Florida
State Historical Society, 1925) , 1:269; Juan Rogel to Francisco de Borgia,
February 5, 1569, printed in Zubillaga, Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 379.
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A Spanish source from 1602 documents the preeminence of
Tacatacuru, and the transition may have occurred earlier. 64 When
- the Spaniards finally retaliated over the winter of 1568-1569, this
was where they directed their efforts, implying that Saturiwa was no
longer their primary concern. 65 Outina or his successor must have
been pleased to see Saturiwa's power wane, even in the wake of the
Franco-Saturiwa victory at San Mateo. In the long run, Outina had
reaped a greater benefit than his rival from his relationships with
the European colonists.
Gourgues vowed to Saturiwa that he would return within a
year, but neither he nor any other French ships visited Florida for
eight years. 66 Dozens of French sailors and soldiers shipwrecked
in the aftermath of Fort Caroline's capture still lingered among
the Indians, but few were with the Timucuans any longer, having
dispersed further north among the Timucuans' northerly
neighbors, the Guale and Orista.
Until 1578 it appeared that Spain's European rivals had
abandoned their designs on Florida. In that year, a French ship
foundered off the coast inhabited by the Guale and Orista.
Around 100 French castaways were captured, and although the
Native Americans enslaved them, the captives allegedly conspired
with the Guale and Orista to contact the Timucuans and suggest
a joint campaign against Spanish St. Augustine. The Guale and
Orista had already destroyed the Spanish settlement nearest
them, Santa Elena, and if the allegation of an impending alliance
with the Timucuans was true, were willing to overcome their own
differences with the Timucuans to expel the Spaniards from their
last major stronghold in Florida. But the Timucuans rejected them.
"The Indians here were not willing to consent to this, saying that
they had peace and quietude with us and did not want any strife,"
wrote Pedro Menendez Marques, now the governor of Florida. 67
A similar event occurred in 1580, when two French ships tried to
64.

Biltasar Lopez, "Declaracion sobre la conveniencia de trasladar el presidio de
San Agustfn y sobre la conversion de los Indios," September 15, 1602, printed
in Relacion H ist6rica De La Florida, Escrita En El Siglo XVII, ed. P. Atanasio Lopez
(Madrid: Impr. de Ramona Velasco, Viuda de P. Perez, 1931) , 28.
65. Juan Rogel to Francisco de Borgia, February 5, 1569, printed in Zubillaga,
Monumenta Antiquae Floridae, 379.
66. Esteban de las Alas to Philip II, May 5, 1568, Patronato 254, N.l ,G.2,R.l, AGI;
La Reprinse de la Floride, f. 25 verso-27 verso.
67. Pedro Menendez Marques to Philip II, June 15, 1578, translated in Connor,
Colonial Records, 2:81.
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encourage another pan-Indian alliance centered in the territory of
the Guale and extending into Timucuan lands. 68 Rivalries between
"the Guale and Timucuans worked against an alliance with the
French, and some of the natives sided with the Spaniards in their
successful repulsion of the French frigates. 69
It is difficult to say precisely why the Timucuans, who formerly
rallied around Saturiwa, now proved unwilling to join the French
and Guale in destroying St. Augustine. As historian John Hann
pointed out, violent Spanish retaliation for previous offenses, the
removal of Saturiwa and Tacatacuru as leaders (Tacatacuru was
executed in 1569 and Saturiwa fades from the historical record),
and longstanding Timucuan-Guale hostilities probably all played
a role. 70
Yet Governor Menendez Marques' depiction of an entirely
subjugated Timucuan population near St. Augustine failed to
capture the reality. There were evidently divisions among the
Timucuans, even in the near vicinity of St. Augustine. On June
6, 1586, Francis Drake arrived at St. Augustine after committing
devastating raids at Santo Domingo and Cartagena. Confronted
by forty-two ships and 2,500 Englishmen, Menendez Marques and
his eighty soldiers gamely defended their fort for a few hours, but
as he explained to Philip II, "as soon as the English came down
upon the fort, the Indians began to burn the town." 71 Not all of the
Indians welcomed the English attackers, though. Drake allegedly
tried to solicit one village near the fort, but found the village
68.

Historians disagree about whether the Gualequini, the primary partners
targeted by the French in 1580, were Guale or Timucuan. See Hann, History of
the Timucua Indians, 70; and Arny Turner Bushnell, Situado and Sabana: Spain s
Support System for the Presidio and Mission Provinces of Florida, Archaeology of
Mission Santa Catalina De Guale 3 (New York: American Museum of Natural
History, 1994), 63 .
69. Bushnell, Situado and Sabana, 63; Officials of Florida to Philip II, October 12,
1580, Santo Domingo 229, f. 26 recto, AGL
70. Hann, History of the Timucua Indians, 70; Paul E. Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers: A
History of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2002)' 57-59.
71. Gabriel de Luxan and Diego Fernandez de Quinones to Philip II,July 1, 1586,
translated in Irene Aloha Wright, Further English Voyages to Spanish America,
1583-1594: Documents from the Archives of the Indies at Seville Illustrating English
Voyages to the Caribbean, the Spanish Main, Florida, and Virginia, Works Issued by
the Hakluyt Society, Series II, vol. XCIX (London: Cambridge University Press
for the Hakluyt Society, 1951), 184-185; other details from Pedro Menendez
Marques to President of the House of Trade, June 17, 1586, translated in ibid.,
163-164.
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abandoned, its residents having fled to the woods. 72 These "friendly
Indians" were supposedly protecting 200 Spanish noncombatants,
but Menendez Marques apparently placed little faith in their
loyalty. "The friendly Indians came down upon a certain estate at a
distance from the fort, where the women and children had taken
refuge," wrote a Spaniard, "in view of which, and finding himself
surrounded by the enemy and Indians, Pedro Menendez Marquez
withdrew and abandoned the fort." 73 Once again, the sources fail
to specify exactly which Timucuans joined the English destruction
of St. Augustine and which abstained, let alone why. But some
Timucuans who had been unwilling to join the proposed alliance
with the French six years previously eagerly joined Drake. Perhaps
they were convinced by an overwhelmingly superior English force,
or perhaps they preferred the absence of Guale auxiliaries.
Where collaboration was required in the borderlands, quick,
decisive strikes like those of Gourgues and Drake proved far easier
to accomplish than sustained partnerships. We know almost nothing
about Drake's interactions with the Timucuans, but Gourgues
and Saturiwa had a relatively straightforward and manageable, if
mistrustful, relationship. Both the Frenchman and the Timucuan
opposed the Spanish-Outina alliance, so they found it relatively easy
to work together for a brief period of time. Gourgues' predecessor,
Laudonniere, had found it far more difficult to turn the intraTimucuan rivalries to his own ends over the long term. Similarly,
Saturiwa had been unable to persuade Laudonniere to take action
against his enemies, and may have had difficulty holding together a
pan-Timucuan opposition to the Spanish-Outina alliance. Adding to
this tension, frequent ruptures in borderland partnerships provided
continual opportunities for new, short-term collaborations. When
the falling out between Outina and Laudonniere forced the French
into fighting against Saturiwa's old rival, the paracoussi took full
advantage of the rift for the short time the French remained in
Florida. Similarly, the Spaniards found that the Saturiwa-Outina
rivalry made it easier to cooperate with Outina when relations were
at their worst with Saturiwa. This may also explain why the Spaniards
felt they could turn to Outina when they faced the combined
Franco-Saturiwa attack.
Evaluating the impact of these relationships from the
Timucuan perspective presents numerous challenges. The
72. Juan de Posada to Philip II, September 2, 1586, translated in ibid. , 205-206.
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hostility of the Spaniards' immediate neighbor, Saturiwa, probably
limited the ability of the former to acquire information about
interactions among the Timucuans. We therefore know less than
we would like about how their participation in the Franco-Spanish
conflict affected them. Additionally, Spanish interests spanned
an enormous geography, and during this period they generally
prioritized their interactions with the Guale and the Calusa rather
than the Timucuans. When, at the end of the sixteenth century,
the Spaniards began to establish missions among the Timucuans,
thereby bringing them into greater familiarity, they found that
the Outina, Potano, and Saturiwa polities, as well as their webs of
alliances, had altered significantly. Saturiwa's heirs had lost their
pre-eminence to Tacatacuru, Outina's subordinates had begun to
peel away, and Potano's chiefdom had largely collapsed, its main
village destroyed. 74
The presence of European soldiers, missionaries, livestock,
and microbes doubtless wreaked significant, often catastrophic
changes, and the overall Timucuan population seems to have
declined after the arrival of Europeans in the sixteenth century.
But the temptation to attribute this change solely to European
intervention should be avoided, as such an interpretation rests on
an implicit premise of a static pre-contact equilibrium. Quite to the
contrary, the Timucuans lived in an inherently dynamic and volatile
political world, and European intervention had the potential to
accelerate or retard pre-existing changes as much as initiate new
ones. Furthermore, an overemphasis on the transformative role
of the Franco-Spanish clash threatens to efface the reciprocity
of relationships between Europeans and Timucuans. Saturiwa
demanded that Laudonniere "show himself a friend of his friends
and an enemy of his enemies,'' and indeed it was those intraIndian political dynamics that drove Timucuans not merely to
adapt or resist European incursions, but rather to actively pursue
partnerships with would-be colonists. 75

73. Alonso Suarez de Toledo to Philip II, July 3, 1586, translated in ibid. , 187.
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